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Introduction
The term “system” has found its way into the language of occupational health and
safety (OH&S), particularly through the rise in popularity of OH&S management
systems (OHSMS). However, the term “system” as a label is of little practical
relevance unless the richness of the concept is understood. Organisations could
benefit from thinking systemically whilst acting systematically. However, to think
systemically, people within organisations need a shared framework or “picture”
that helps organise their thinking. Systems thinking can help provide this frame-
work and allow for the integration and interrogation of existing OH&S knowledge
and accumulated wisdom. The “Systems Model of Risk Control” (SMRC) is a
framework that assists organisations to become learning communities. The SMRC
allows everyone in an organisation to share a common picture of how OH&S is
managed and how risk is controlled. OHSMS are one component of a systems
approach to risk control. Over-reliance upon OHSMS when implemented out of
context may not represent the best use of resources available for risk improvement
or enhance OH&S performance. The SMRC allows organisations to move beyond
the “one-size fits all” approach to OH&S management and to develop and share
an approach that best suits organisational needs. Individual organisational needs
may or may not be best served by an OH&S management system.
Over the past decade, a range of approaches to improving occupational health and
safety (OH&S) has confronted organisations. This includes cultural change, team-
work, benchmarking, integrated management systems, quality management, risk
assessment, behaviour modification programs and OH&S management systems.
Often, these are collectively known as best practice but which approach or combi-
nation of approaches that an organisation should select is unclear.
The use of OH&S management systems has emerged as a particularly popular
approach to reducing injury and illness in the workplace.1 A systems approach to
OH&S management is currently the preferred language of OH&S professionals,
OH&S researchers, governments, standards bodies and organisations. According
to Hale and Hovden,2 the use of OH&S management systems in the 1990’s
represents the third age of safety. The first age was a technical age that lasted from
the start of the century to post world war two, whilst human factors and the 1980’s
characterised the second age.2
In Australia, the 1995 Industry Commission3 inquiry and report into OH&S
recognised that best practice organisations, measured in terms of OH&S outcomes,
have enterprise safety management systems. The Commission recommended that
OH&S legislation in each jurisdiction recognise safety management systems as a
means for managing risk.4
Internationally, despite the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)
decision in 1997 not to proceed with an international standard on OH&S manage-
ment, there remains a strong global trend towards the development of specifica-
tion and guidance standards for OH&S management systems by both government
and non-government bodies.5
OH&S Management Systems Defined
This enthusiasm for the adoption of OH&S management systems has resulted in
a plethora of propriety products becoming available to organisations. Many
prospective purchasers are not only unsure of their needs but also unaware of the
benefits that than an “off the shelf” system may offer. Defining ‘OH&S manage-
ment system’ would help alleviate this uncertainty.
Waring6 provides what he refers to as a working definition, that is:
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A structured systematic means for ensuring that both general and particular
aspects of what the organization does are effectively managed to meet high
standards of safety.
Standards Australia7 define an OH&S management system as:
That part of the overall management system which includes organizational
structure, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures, proc-
esses and resources for developing, implementing, achieving, reviewing and
maintaining the OHS policy, and so managing the OHS risks associated with
the business of the organization.
Both definitions focus upon the purpose of the system, that is, to effectively
manage OH&S risks within organisations. In his definition, Waring6 describes an
OH&S management system as a structured systematic means for managing risk.
This is construed to be similar to Standards Australia’s7 approach that describes
such activities as planning, developing and implementing. It can thus be inferred
that both definitions are referring to systematic approaches to risk control.
There are, however, differences between a systematic and systems approach to risk
control that need to be recognised. It is possible to have a systematic approach
without fully understanding the risk control system. Waring6 argues that this
confusion between system and systematic  explains why some so-called systems often fail
to meet expectations  Waring8 defines systematic as an organized way of doing some-
thing. OH&S management systems represent an organised way for controlling risk.
OH&S management systems contain some but not all of the ingredients of a systems
approach.6 Such misunderstanding and confusion over the use of language may
result in organisations over-looking significant opportunities for risk improve-
ment.
To capture the significant opportunities for risk improvement that arise out of an
understanding of the risk control system, those who work within organisations
would benefit from having systems understandings before engaging in systematic
improvement. In particular, a systems framework would enable leaders and
managers to learn from system failures and organise their thinking in relation to
systems approaches to managing risk.
Several writers have already identified the need for such a framework. For exam-
ple, Cox and Cox9 have argued that:
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... for organisations to develop a vision and a strategy for managing any
particular function, it must have a way of thinking about it. The organisation
must a have a conceptual framework for managing that function.
Hale et al.10 following a review of the literature on safety management systems
(SMS), came to a similar view:
... there have been few attempts to produce coherent and comprehensive
models of an SMS ... there is increasing literature in the area which is difficult
to interpret and use without some framework which indicates how the
results might be linked together. There is a need for a framework to represent
that complexity and dynamics of management in this area.
Viner11 provides an even deeper insight:
... we have no internationally recognised set of concepts (and consequently
terms to use in speech) nor a uniformity of approach to the subject which
assists professionals from the diverse interested fields to communicate with
one another.
Therefore, a systems framework for risk control should at least meet the following
criteria. It should:
• define terms;
• be both simple and comprehensive;
• be practical;
• unify existing accident causation theory and OH&S management knowledge;
• promote a shared understanding;
• promote a common language; and,
• allow for description, analysis, synthesis and improvement.
Consequently, this paper has two aims. It will:
• apply the ideas of systems thinking leading to the development of a systems
framework for accident causation and risk control; and,
• unify contemporary OH&S theories within the framework.
The development of a systems framework for accident causation and risk control
allows for OH&S management systems, together with the range of other ap-
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proaches to OH&S, to assume the context and purpose identified as necessary for
the effective, systematic control of OH&S risk.
A Review of Systems Thinking as a Framework
The term system has become a fashionable label in Western society to such an extent
that Flood and Jackson12 argue that it has been rendered useless. The way the term
has found its way into use in popular OH&S language is evidence of this general-
ised labelling. Flood and Jackson12 argued for a return to the richness of the concept
system as a means to enhance its practical relevance. Systems thinking or treating
organisms as whole entities, which cannot be understood from examining their
parts, emerged in the 1940’s in response to the failure of mechanistic or reductionist
thinking. Therefore, systems thinking is a particular way of organising thoughts
about the world, organisations and problems.12 Waring8 defines the concept of a
system as a recognizeable whole consisting of a number of parts [called components or
elements] that are connected up in an organized way. Senge et al.13 illustrate the concept
of a whole in the following way:
... you won’t be able to “divide your elephant in half” ... you can’t redesign
your system (the elephant) by dividing it into parts; everyone must look at
the whole together.
Checkland and Scholes14 described the purpose of systems thinking as the con-
struction of abstract systems models against the perceived real world, in order to
learn about and improve some aspect of the real world. In this instance, the aspect
of the real world to be learnt about and improved is OH&S.
Systems theory and systems thinking is, however, a labyrinth of abstract terminol-
ogy, methodologies and system types. For example, Jackson15 identifies and
analyses five methodological approaches to systems thinking - organisations as
systems, hard systems thinking, organisational cybernetics, soft systems thinking
and critical systems thinking. Carter et al.16 argued that a particular system may
be made up of a range of system types, for example, natural systems, abstract
systems, designed systems and systems of human activities. Waring,8 drawing
upon the work of Carter et al.16 presents three types of systems thinking that are
also similar to Jackson’s;15 hard systems thinking, soft systems thinking and
systems failures thinking. By comparison, in a discussion of system types, Mant17
uses a frog and a bike as metaphors to differentiate between system level (context
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and purpose) and component level (operations and function) solutions to prob-
lems. Mant17 argues that:
... You can disassemble a bicycle completely ... and reassemble it confident
that it will work as before. Frogs are different. The moment you remove any
part, all the rest of the system is affected instantly ... for the worse ...
Before systems thinking can be used as an organising framework for unifying
existing OH&S knowledge, it is useful to have a deeper understanding of organi-
sations as systems. According to Jackson,15 systems theory has competed with
scientific management and human relations theory as the prominent management
model within organisational theory since the 1930’s.
Although the idea of organisations as systems is underpinned by a number of
theoretical approaches, contingency theory and sociotechnical systems theory are
discussed here as they are relevant to the use of systems thinking as an organising
framework for unifying existing OH&S knowledge.
Contingency theory came into prominence in the 1970’s and views organisations
as consisting of a series of interdependent subsystems, each of which has a function to
perform within the context of the organization as a whole.15 Contingency theory assumes
an open systems view. That is, the system interacts with its external environment
(through a management sub-system), comprises inputs, processes and outputs
(through a technical sub-system) and relies upon feedback to keep the system in
a stable state.15 Jackson15 identified four hypotheses upon which contingency
theory rests, the essence of which is that there is not one best way to manage an
organisation in all circumstances.
Sociotechnical systems theory is associated with the empirical investigations in the
Coal Mining Studies of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations from the 1940’s
onwards. Sociotechnical systems theory argued that organisations will only
achieve their purpose if the social, technological, and economic dimensions are jointly
optimized, and if they are treated as open systems and fitted into their environments.
Sociotechnical systems theory focuses upon the alignment of work groups and
technology.15
It is possible to be lost in the labyrinth that is systems theory and systems thinking.
However, Flood and Jackson12 provide some degree of clarity when describing the
general conception of a system (see figure 1) in terms of it having a boundary, an
environment within which it operates, feedback loops, inputs, processes and
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outputs; and, comprising elements and relationships between the elements. Senge
et al.13 describe this relationship between elements in terms of links and loops:
... from any element in a situation ... you can trace arrows (“links”) that
represent influence on another element. ... links never exist in isolation. They
always comprise a circle of causality, a feedback “loop” ...
Figure 1. Flood and Jackson’s General Conception of a “System”’
Together, system elements form sub-systems, which in turn form systems operat-
ing within an environment. Finally, there is a hierarchy of possible system descriptions
ranging from broad scope and coarse resolution to limited scope and finer resolu-
tion.16
Systems thinking and OH&S
The application of systems thinking in relation to OH&S evolved during the 1960’s
when trial and error approaches were no longer adequate for systems that had to be
first-time safe, for example aviation.18 This led to the emergence of a new discipline
- system safety - particularly within the weapons and aerospace industries, and
the application of such methodological approaches to system safety as fault tree
analysis. This new approach to system safety identified that risk control must be
a life-cycle effort spanning the concept, design, production, operations and dis-
posal phases of the life-cycle, with every attempt being made to design out risks
in the first instance.18
An ‘element’ A relationship
Outputs
Boundary
“The environement”These three elements
are on a feedback loop
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Stephenson18 defines a system as the composite of people, procedures, and plant and
hardware working within a given environment to perform a given task (see figure 2). He
defines system safety as the discipline that uses systematic engineering and management
techniques to aid in making systems safe throughout their life cycles.
Figure 2. Stephenson’s System Safety Model
In the early 1970’s, Johnson and Lowman19 applied systems concepts to OH&S
when they developed the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) as part
of their research conducted for the United States Atomic Energy Commission.
More recently a number of authors have called for the application of systems ideas
to learning from failures and managing and improving OH&S.9,20,21,22,23,6,7 Addi-
tionally, as previously discussed, there is a global trend towards the development
of OH&S management systems.
To take a specific example, Reason24 argued that there have been three over-lap-
ping ages of safety. In the 1990’s, OH&S moved into the third age of safety – a
sociotechnical age, a move away from the technical and human error ages of
previous decades. Reason’s view provides an interesting counterpoint to that of
Hale and Hovden2 who argued that the 1990’s, as the third age of safety, are
characterised by OH&S management systems. In drawing upon systems theory
Reason25 argued that:
Although general systems theory and the notions of sociotechnical systems
theory have been with us for quite some time, decades passed before most
of us began fully to realise their implications for accident prevention and
safety, namely to recognise that the major residual safety problems do not
People Plant &
Hardware
Tasks
Procedures
Environment
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belong exclusively to either the technical or the human domains. Rather they
emerge from as yet little understood interactions between technical and
social aspects of the system.
Rasmussen22 also acknowledged the relationship between sociotechnical systems
theory and risk management but raised the debate to the level of a cross-discipli-
nary convergence of ideas at all levels of the system for a particular hazard.
Rasmussen22 argued that this requires a system-oriented approach based on functional
abstraction rather than structural decomposition.
A Review of Key OH&S Theories
Theories of accident causation and risk control have developed in depth and scope
throughout most of the twentieth century as is evidenced by the work of Viner11,
Culvenor25 and Reason.26,24,27,28 Over the past decade, each has contributed signifi-
cantly to the understanding of the processes that lead to damage, and each have
developed and published their own models for understanding risk control.
The occurrence consequence model
In 1991, Viner published Accident Analysis and Risk Control in which he reviewed
a range of OH&S theories and models. In this work he argued strongly in favour
of the application of scientific method to the study and understanding of the
processes that give rise to damage and their control. He further argued that
hypotheses are difficult to prove in OH&S and suggested alternative criteria.11
• The ability to define terms in a non-judgemental way; and,
• The utility of the concept in terms of satisfying our needs for a useful analyti-
cal tool which will stimulate research and be of value to practitioners.
Viner dispensed with the word accident. Instead he referred to the process leading
to damage as the occurrence and the injury and ill health that results from this
process the consequence.11 The models he reviewed were selected on the basis of
their intrinsic or historical interest and significance.11 The range of models reviewed
illustrates how different models suit different circumstances.
A summary and short commentary on each model is shown in table 1.
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Table 1. A summary of OH&S models reviewed by Viner.
Category Author Model
Heinrich (1959) The Domino Model: Models the causes of
accidents and asserts that 88% of injuries are
due to unsafe acts, 10% to unsafe conditions and
2% are simply unpreventable. Eliminating unsafe
acts can reduce accidents.
Cause –Effect Models The Swedish Information
System
Accidents occur as a series or sequence of
events.
Compes (1979) A chain of multi-causal events occurring
sequentially in time.
Psychological Models Waller and Klein (1973) The Task-Demand Model: Focus is upon the
individual worker and their performance relative
to the demands placed upon that performance by
the task. Keeping the task within the limits of
human performance can reduce accidents.
Surry (1974) Decision Model: Focus is upon the cognitive
processes of the individual worker in their
environment and their capacity to perceive,
process and respond to danger.
Corlett and Gilbank (1978) A detailed analysis of the human as an
information processor. 
Wigglesworth (1972) Injury Causation Model: Focus is upon the
individual worker and hazards. Injury occurs
when errors (a missing or inappropriate response
to a stimuli) are made in the presence of a
hazard (a source of potentially damaging
energy). Reducing errors can prevent accidents.
Energy Based Models Gibson (1961) and Haddon
(1973)
Energy Damage Concepts: Focus is upon the
need for energy to be present for injury to occur.
Preventing unwanted energy transfers can
prevent accidents.
Uncertainty and
Probability Models
Rowe (1977) The Risk Estimation Model: Uncertainty is an
inherent part of the damage process.
In his analysis of these models, Viner11 concluded that there are three basic
principles that arise:
1. Energy is required to produce injury and damage
2. The process develops sequentially in time
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3. That the process involves uncertainty
Viner11 used these principles as the basis for the development of three related
models shown at figure 3.
Figure 3. Viner’s Models: Top – The Extended Energy Damage Model, Middle – The
Generalised Time Sequence Model, Bottom – The Occurrence-Consequence Model.
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Viner11 defines the terms used in each model. For example, hazard is defined as a
source of potentially damaging energy and event as that point in time at which control is
lost over the potentially damaging properties of the energy source.
The ergonomic hazard management model
Culvenor25 reviewed the history of OH&S theory. Like Viner, Culvenor reviewed
the pioneering work of Heinrich and the subsequent development of the safe
person versus safe place ways of thinking about safety problems and the classifi-
cation of accident causes. Culvenor25 stated that recent surveys conducted in
Australia found evidence that in Australia today, the role of unsafe behaviour remains
entrenched and that worker carelessness was the cause of accidents.
After dispensing with the role of unsafe behaviours as a case of mistaken identity,
Culvenor turns his attention to the concept of control at source. Control at source
is based upon the occupational hygiene principle of hazard -> source -> pathway
receiver.25 Culvenor goes on to draw upon the earlier of work of Gibson (1961),
Haddon (1963) and Viner (1991) by defining the hazard source in terms of energy.
At this point, Culvenor’s thinking converges with Viner’s in that the process
leading to damage is understood in terms of the energy source  -> pathway ->
receiver.24
Culvenor’s thinking diverges from Viner’s through the application of ergonomic
thinking and models as means of identifying opportunities for control. Culvenor25
reviewed the work of Birmingham and Taylor (1961), Taylor (1957), Chapanis
(1965), Kuhlmann (1986), Hammond (1978) and Grandjean (1982) and concluded
that:
... the study of ergonomics has shown the importance of the interaction of
system elements. It is not only good human skills, good equipment, and good
environment conditions or systems that are important for good design, it is
the quality of the interaction between these elements.
In consolidating the various approaches (see figure 4) Culvenor argues that the
classic person-equipment-environment ergonomic model can be combined with the tradi-
tional hazard source pathway receiver model to show more clearly the relationship
of the ergonomic elements in the action of control.25
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Figure 4. Culvenor’s Ergonomic Hazard Management Model
The organizational accident causation model
James Reason has long been involved in research into human error. Reason26
defined human error as a:
... generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence
of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and
when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance
agency.
Reason26 developed a conceptual framework (the generic error-modelling system
[GEMS]) as a means for locating the origins of various error types. According to
Reason,25 the purpose of GEMS is to integrate slips, lapse and mistake type errors
into Rasmussen’s skill-rule-knowledge classifications of human performance to
arrive at three basic error types:
1. Skill-based slips (and lapses)
2. Rule-based mistakes
3. Knowledge-based mistakes
Over the past decade, Reason has shifted his focus to organisational errors. He
argued that human error is a consequence not a cause and that human errors are
shaped and provoked by upstream workplace and organizational factors.28 Prevention
depends upon an understanding of the organisational factors that provoked the
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error. These organisational factors have variously been termed latent errors25, latent
failures24and most recently - latent conditions.28 Reason26 defined a latent failure as:
... an error or violation that was committed at least one to two days before
the start of the actual emergency and played a necessary (though not suffi-
cient) role in causing the disaster.
Reason27 described the influence of organisational factors upon human error in the
following way:
Management decisions regarding, say, training, the allocation of resources,
cost-cutting, reduced manning levels, and the like can increase error likeli-
hood in the workplace by creating error-enforcing and violation-promoting
conditions at the ‘sharp end’ (e.g. poor provision of tools and equipment,
high workloads, time pressure, inappropriate or unavailable procedures,
lack of knowledge and experience, fatigue-enhancing shiftwork patterns,
low morale, etc.)
Reason argued that latent conditions are spawned by those distant in space and
time from the worker work interface and may lie dormant in the system for many
years.
He further argued that latent conditions follow two interrelated pathways to the
workplace.
1. An active failures pathway that originates in top-level decisions and which
manifest itself in the workplace as error promoting conditions.
2. And a latent conditions pathway that runs directly from organizational proc-
esses to deficiencies in the system’s defences.27 These pathways are shown
in figure 5.
164 - OHSMS Proceedings of the First National Conference
Figure 5. Reason’s Model of Organizational Accident Causation
Discussion of models
Each of the contemporary thinkers discussed above has made valuable contribu-
tions from their particular perspective. Viner contributed an understanding of the
role energy plays in the damage process and how this process develops sequen-
tially over time and is inherently uncertain. Culvenor, by combining ergonomic
thinking with the concept of control at source for a particular hazard. Finally
Reason unravels human error and organisational error, identifying the limitations
of the former in favour of the opportunities of the latter for prevention.
The differences between, and the limitations of, each model are compensated for
by the synergy between the models. As an example, Viner’s development of condi-
tions supporting possible event mechanisms under the control of the supervisory system
within time zone one are closely related to Reason’s development of latent condi-
tions at the organisational level of the system. Both Viner and Reason sequentially
build up the process leading to damage. While Culvenor’s model does not provide
for this sense of time, if it is located within time zone one of Viner’s occurrence-
consequence model, then it does identify the points of intervention for risk control
by the supervisory system at the organisational level. Both Culvenor and Reason
acknowledged the limitations of focusing upon the behaviour of the individual
worker at the workplace, in favour of upstream system approaches to prevention.
Models tend to stand alone reflecting the interest and discipline of the researcher.
The challenge for the next generation of thinking is to achieve consilience. Wilson29
suggests that:
Organisation Workplace Person/Team Defences Outcome
Management
decisions
and
organisational
processes
Error and
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The greatest challenge today ... in all of science ... is the accurate and complete
description of complex systems. Scientists have broken down many kinds of
systems. They know most of the elements and forces. The next task is to
reassemble them ...
The next section takes on this challenge and attempts to reassemble and unify
OH&S knowledge using systems theory as an organising framework.
Systems Models of Accident Causation and Risk Control
In drawing the threads of this discussion together, the first steps towards consil-
ience are taken using systems theory. This will supply the organising framework
for the development of a new systems models of accident causation and risk
control and allow for the unification of the ideas of Viner, Culvenor, Reason with
systems safety/systems failure thinking.
Wilson30 defines a model as:
... the explicit interpretation of one’s understanding of a situation, or merely
one’s ideas about the situation. It can be expressed in mathematics, symbols
or words, but it is essentially a description of entities and the relationships
between them. It may be prescriptive or illustrative, but above all, it must be
useful.
In the first instance, formal systems models of accident causation and risk control
(SMAC/SMRC – hereafter referred to as “the models” and shown in figures 6 and
7 respectively) will be described. The same ideas are then simplified into a systems
model of OH&S management (figure 8).
The models use a recognisable and memorable symbol30 to represent the boundary
of the risk control system - a five point star. Each point of the star represents a
critical sub-system for analysing failure or understanding risk control. Polygons
(pentagons) are used to illustrate the organised interconnectedness of these sub-
systems consistent with systems theory.
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At the centre of the star is work and hazards. The bottom four points of the star
represent the workplace and represent a combination of Stephenson’s18 systems
safety model, Culvenor’s25 ergonomic hazard management model and the ideas
of sociotechnical systems theory. ‘Hazard’ is defined as a source of potentially
damaging energy in accordance with Viner’s models.11 There are no limitations to
what can be thought of as work. What constitutes ‘work’ will be defined by the
practical interest of the analyst. At the coarsest level of resolution ‘work’ may refer
to all of the operating sites of a multi-national company, conversely, at the finest
level of resolution, a person typing a paper using a word processor.
The inverted triangle behind the star is an abstracted version of Reason’s model.
It picks up the idea that management decisions and organisational processes may
lead to the development of latent conditions in the risk control system - the
precursors of active failures (human error).
The inverted triangle serves three other analytical and descriptive purposes:
1. It illustrates that the points of the star are organised from the top down to
form a hierarchy of risk control:
• safe organisation (top point of the star)
• safe place (middle two points of the star)
• safe person (bottom two points of the star)
2. It illustrates that the area of focus for prevention is at the top of the star
3. It indicates the direction of influences in the risk control system using a
vertical inputs-process-outputs concept from systems thinking. System
outputs may be either risk control (the preferred system state) or an
event with outcomes which may lead to injury. Both outputs feedback
into the system at the organisational level and bring with them influ-
ences from the outer context.
The incorporation of Viner’s generalised time sequence model adds a temporal
dimension to the framework. The objective of any organisation should be to
maintain the reliability of the risk control system in time zone one and across the life
cycle of the business. The framework provides organisations with a picture of what
lies in store if the reliability of the risk control system is not maintained – a move
into time zones two and three and their associated losses. From the vantage point of
time zone one, organisations are able to peer into time zones two and three through
their risk analysis binoculars. What they will see is Viner’s occurrence-conse-
quence model as a structured means for analysing risk.11
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The models are embedded within an organisational (inner) context. In turn the
organisation operates in and interacts with an external environment or outer
context. For example, the political, social, economic and industrial elements of the
outer context are likely to influence the inner context of the organisation that in
turn will influence the system for risk control.
The models also allow for deeper interrogation and analysis of any the five
sub-systems whilst retaining an understanding of the whole. For example, it is
possible to break the organisational environment down and speculate on its
constituent elements and their relationships as well as the relationship between
these elements and the role they play in influencing the level of risk in the system.
According to current OH&S and management thinking these elements could
include:
• Leadership, the influence of leadership on culture and the influence of cul-
ture on performance31,28,32,6
• The age of the organisation28
• The ‘type’ of organisation10
Management approaches may be broken down in a similar way – possibly into
two categories: generic and OH&S specific approaches. Generic approaches could
include quality management and its application to OH&S through the develop-
ment of integrated management systems and the use of teamwork. Specific OH&S
approaches, for example, safe behaviour programs, could be analysed in the
context of the whole system and underpinned by an understanding of human and
organisational error.
The benefit of the models is that it enables those who are interested in accident
analysis and risk control to develop a deeper understanding and ask informed
questions and make informed decisions. Organisations could use the models as
frameworks against which they could evaluate their existing paradigms and
mental models and select an approach or combination of approaches to risk control
that best suits their needs. This approach is similar to the hypothesis underlying
contingency theory that there is no one best way to structure the activities of the
organisation in all circumstances - in other words “one size does not fit all”,
different approaches may well apply in different circumstances.
The models may be simplified to provide a memorable systems view of OH&S
management (see figure 8). Such a view or picture provides context and purpose
for OH&S management “systems”. Organisations that operate from a shared
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picture or mental model of OH&S management and risk control may achieve better
OH&S outcomes.
Figure 8. A Systems View of OH&S Management.
Conclusion
To date, the approach or combination of approaches that an organisation should
select to improve OH&S has been unclear. Arguably, organisations must benefit
from a framework that enables them to see the various approaches available, in
the context of a whole. Such a framework is the systems models of accident
causation and risk control. The models use systems thinking as an organising
framework for unifying existing occupational health and safety knowledge. Its
potential benefits will enable organisations to learn about, and organise, their risk
control thinking leading to a better-informed selection of approaches to OH&S risk
improvement.
Risk Control
Work &
Hazards
Fit-for-
purpose
equipment
Competent &
knowledgeable 
workers
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rules &
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Well designed
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environment
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organisational environment &
management approach
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